Fra BPs globale energirapport for 2018 (utkommet i Juni) :

Oil
The annual average oil price (Dated Brent) rose to $71.31 per barrel, up from $54.19/barrel in 2017. Oil consumption grew by an above-average 1.4 million barrels per day (b/d), or 1.5%. China (680,000 b/d) and the US (500,000 b/d) were the largest contributors to growth. Global oil production rose by 2.2 million b/d. Almost all of the net increase was accounted for by the US, with their growth in production (2.2 million b/d) a record for any country in any year. Elsewhere, production growth in Canada (410,000 b/d) and Saudi Arabia (390,000 b/d) was outweighed by declines in Venezuela (-580,000 b/d) and Iran (-310,000 b/d). Refinery throughput rose by 960,000 b/d, down from 1.5 million b/d in 2017. Nevertheless, average refinery utilization climbed to its highest level since 2007.

Global oljeproduksjon 2018
OPEC production fell by 0.3 Mb/d in 2018, with a marked increase in Saudi Arabian production (0.4 Mb/d) offset by falls in Venezuela (-0.6 Mb/d) and Iran (-0.3 Mb/d). But this year-on-year comparison doesn’t do justice to the intra-year twists and turns in OPEC production. The ride began in the first half of 2018 with the continuation of the OPEC+ agreement from December 2016. The OPEC+ group consistently overshot their agreed production cuts during 2017 and this overshooting increased further during the first half of 2018, largely reflecting continuing falls in Venezuelan output. These production cuts helped push OECD inventories below their five year moving average for the first time since the collapse in oil prices in 2014. The first major twist came in the middle of 2018: in response to falling Venezuelan production and the US announcing in May its intention to impose sanctions on all Iranian oil exports, the OPEC+ group in June committed to achieving 100% compliance of their production cuts for the group as a whole. This commitment contained two important signals. First, given the extent to which production was below the target level, it signalled the prospect of an immediate increase in production. Second, it helped reduce the uncertainty associated with the possibility of future disruptions to either Iranian and Venezuelan production since the commitment to maintain “100% compliance” in essence signalled the willingness of other members of the OPEC+ group to offset any lost production. As a result, between May and November of last year, net production by the OPEC+ group increased by 900 Kb/d, despite Iranian and Venezuelan production falling by a further 1 Mb/d. Job done. Or was it? The problem with trying to stabilize oil markets is that there is always some other pesky development that you hadn’t expected. Oil production by Libya and Nigeria – neither of which were part of the OPEC+ agreement – increased by more than 500 Kb/d between June and November of last year. As a result, OECD inventories started to grow again. The growing sense of excess supply was compounded by the US announcing in November that it would grant temporary waivers for some imports of Iranian oil. This triggered another twist: a new OPEC+ group was formed in December of last year – this time excluding Iran and Venezuela, as well as Libya, but including Nigeria – with a commitment to reduce production by 1.2 Mb/d relative to October 2018 levels. After a slow start, by the spring of this year, inventories have fallen back to around their five year average once again. It’s tempting to interpret these twists and turns as indicative of OPEC’s waning powers. But I’m not sure that’s the correct interpretation. The role that OPEC+ played in more than offsetting the falls in Iranian and Venezuelan output last year was very significant. For me, the twists and turns simply reflect the difficulty of market management, especially in a world of record supply growth in one part of the world and heightened geopolitical tensions in others. It feels like the rollercoaster will run for some time to come.